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Abstract
There is a well-established theory and practice for creating correct-by-construction functional
programs by extracting them from constructive proofs of assertions of the form ∀x : A.∃y :
B.R(x, y). There have been several efforts to extend this methodology to concurrent programs,
say by using linear logic, but there is no practice and the results are limited.
In this paper we define a logic of events that justifies the extraction of correct distributed
processes from constructive proofs that system specifications are achievable, and we describe an
implementation of an extraction process in the context of constructive type theory. We show that
a class of message automata, similar to IO automata and to active objects, are realizers for this
logic. We provide a relative consistency result for the logic. We show an example of protocol
derivation in this logic, and show how to embed temporal logics such as TLA+ in the event
logic.
1 Introduction
The idea of creating functional programs that are correct-by-construction is old and well-studied
[20, 9, 22, 19, 47, 52]. Several implementations by extraction have been built based on the concept
of proofs-as-programs (e.g. Alf, MetaPRL, Nuprl, Coq, Lego), and many interesting examples are
well-known, including solutions of Higman’s lemma [51] and a recent program for Buchberger’s
Gro¨bner basis algorithm [57]. The extracted functional programs are called realizers for propo-
sitions. In this paper we deal with logics such as constructive type theory, in which all provable
assertions have realizers.
For many years researchers have tried to extend this methodology to concurrent programs by extend-
ing the proofs-as-programs principle to something worthy of the name proofs-as-processes princi-
ple. In 1994 Samson Abramsky wrote an article [4] under this title in which linear logic was the
basic logic and certain nondeterministic programs in [10] were considered as realizers. Robin Mil-
ner and his students also took up this challenge, and there are now a number of results along these
lines [7, 49].
In this paper we look at a different approach to the problem. We aim to extract distributed systems
from proofs of system specifications that arise in practice. The abstract realizers are called message
automata, and they resemble the IO automata of Lynch and Tuttle [43], and the active objects of
Chandy [15].
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The specification language arose from our experience in describing and proving properties of im-
plemented protocols in systems such as Ensemble [13, 12, 14, 31, 32, 37, 36, 41, 58], UAV [35],
and MediaNet [54].
Our approach to presenting the logic is to follow Martin-Lo¨f’s discipline for type theory; that is,
present the computation system first and then introduce types and logic as a way of classifying and
making assertions about data. In our case it will be assertions about distributed computations of
these automata which operate by sending messages and reacting to the receipt of messages. These
computations give rise to an event system which is the computational model for our logic.
2 The Computation System
2.1 Message Automata
A message automaton is a nondeterministic state machine. Its actions are to send and receive mes-
sages, and to execute internal state transitions. Leaving aside more detailed type constraints, a
message automaton will be characterized by three types: St, Act, and Msg, which are the states,
actions and messages, respectively.
Message automata are elements of the following dependent record type:
{ St,Act,Msg : Type; init : St;
f : (Act+Msg)→ St→ St;
send : (Act+Msg)→ St→MsgList }
A possible computation is a stream of alternating states, queues and events, say
s0, q0, a0, s1, q1, a1, . . . .
If event ai is an internal action, then
si+1 = f(ai)(si) and qi+1 = enq(send(ai)(si)qi).
If ai is a message receive, then si+1 = f(ai)(si), and
qi+1 = enq(send(ai)(si) deq?(ai, qi+1)),
where deq? takes the received message from the queue.
2.2 Distributed Systems
Given a message automaton M , there may be many possible computations consistent with it. If
there are no messages, then M can act like an ordinary nondeterministic automaton (finite or in-
finite state). We are interested in computations that arise from interaction with an environment
which creates messages; typically the messages are sent by other automata. We consider only fair
computations, in which every message that is sent will be received.
We focus on collections of message automata, sayM1,M2, . . . ,Mk, that are connected in a network
by the links. We assume that Links forms a directed graph with Mi at the nodes. We speak of Mi
as located at a node. Each link l has a source (src) and a destination (dst). Associated with each
link is a list of messages that originate at the source and arrive at the destination. We call such a
collection a distributed system.
Our execution model assumes that at each location there is a computation; that is a stream of alter-
nating states and actions, and the links are message queues.
2.3 Possible Computations
The possible computations (or worlds) of a distributed system is a collection of computations at each
node which are compatible. We define these in terms of an idealized global discrete progression of
time indexed by the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . . This notion of time will not be reflected in the
logic.
Intuitively a possible computation arises as follows. At time 0 each Mi is in a designated initial state
s(i, 0). At time 1, if some Mi can take an action, it may advance to state s(i, 1). Not all Mi that
can act are required to take a step, but eventually there must be a time t at which it will move. If an
action results in a send, say < m, l >, then m is added to the message queue from src(l) to dst(l),
and the state is changed. If there is a message on l at time t, then a possible action is a receive at
dst(l), and the message is removed from the fifo queue.
The collective state of the distributed system is given by s(i, t), the state of Mi at time t ∈ N, and
a(i, t), the action taken at time t — which can be null. The collective state also keeps track of the
messages sent by Mi at time t, msg(i, t). This is a list of the message and the link on which it is
sent. For convenience, we also have link(l, t), the list of messages on link l before time t; all the
receive actions on l before time t, rcvs(l, t); and all the sends before t, sends(l, t).
The lists link(l, t), rcvs(l, t) and sends(l, t) form queues. We can test for emptiness, find the head,
know the length, etc. We assume that the links are reliable (no message is lost) and fifo. We assume
that the computation is fair, that is, for every queue, infinitely often it is either empty or a receive
action occurs at its destination automaton.
2.4 Refinements of the Automata and Frame Conditions
We refine the definition of message automata by being more detailed about the structure of the state
and by typing the operations. For example, the automaton will declare its state variables, say xj .
By convention the only changes to state variables are given by actions that explicitly mention those
variables. Since we want each clause of the definition of an automaton to be meaningful on its own,
we can’t rely on this convention, so we have to state explicitly exactly which actions effect which
variables. We do this with a frame condition; frame(x) is a list of all the actions that can change
variable x. We do the same for message sends; sframe(l) will list all actions that can send on link
l, and moreover, we will refine the notion of messages to include tags, so sframe will have inputs
< tag, link >.
2.5 Typing and Examples
Message automata are formalized in the type theory on which the logic of events is based. Our
investigations started with such a formalization [11, 21]. We leave these details to the examples that
appear later.
3 Event Systems
We want an abstract model that can capture the observable features of a distributed system. The
fundamental types are locations and events which we can think of as space and time coordinates, as
in Lamport [38]. Information is stored at a location as the value of a state variable or an observable
and information is passed from one location to another along links in the form of messages.
A message will consist of a link, a tag, and a value whose type may depend on the link and the tag.
Msg(Lnk, Tag,M) ≡ l : Lnk × tg : Tag × M(l, tg)
msg(l, tg, v) ≡ 〈l, t, v〉
mlnk(msg(l, tg, v)) ≡ l
mtag(msg(l, tg, v)) ≡ tg
mval(msg(l, tg, v)) ≡ v
haslink(l,ms) ≡ (mlnk(ms) = l)
hastag(tg,ms) ≡ (mtag(ms) = tg)
Msgl(Lnk, Tag,M) ≡ {ms :Msg(Lnk, Tag,M)) | haslink(l,ms)}
onlink(l,mss) ≡ [ms ∈ mss | haslink(l,ms)]
onlinktagged(l, tg,mss) ≡ [ms ∈ mss | haslink(l,ms) ∧ hastag(tg,ms)]
Every event will have a kind, a value, and a location. So an event is a point in spacetime. The receipt
of a message msg(l, tg, v) will be one kind of event, and there will also be local events whose kinds
are in a type of action names A.
Knd(Lnk, Tag,A) ≡ Lnk × Tag +A
isrcv(k) ≡ isl(k)
islocal(k) ≡ isr(k)
rcvl(tg) ≡ inl〈l, tg〉
local(a) ≡ inr(a)
lnk(rcvl(tg)) ≡ l
tag(rcvl(tg)) ≡ tg
act(local(a)) ≡ a
kindcase(f, g, k) ≡ if islocal(k) then f(act(k)) else g(lnk(k), tag(k))
An event system is a structure consisting types, operations, and axioms. There are six typesE,Loc, Lnk,X,A, Tag
for the events, locations, links, observables, local action kinds, and message tags. These must all
be discrete types – equality on each type is decidable. The operations include src and dst which
assign source and destination location to the links, forming a graph structure on the locations and
links. Operations loc, kind, and val extract the location, kind, and value from an event. Operations
when, after, and initially observe the values of the observables at the points in spacetime. Messages
must originate at some point in spacetime, and the operations sends, sender, and index define this
structure. The sends(l, e) of an event e on link l will be a list of messages on that link that originate
at e. We build the semantics of message delivery into our model in a way that makes every link into
a reliable fifo channel. Thus every message is eventually received, and for a receive event e′, the
operations sender(e′) and index(e′) will provide the originator of the message received and the
index of that message in the list that originated there. The temporal order structure on our spacetime
is provided by two orderings on events <loc and≺, as in Lamport [38]. The local ordering <loc is a
total, discrete, well-founded, linear ordering on events with the same location. So, at each location,
if there are any events, there must be a <loc-minimal event satisfying the predicate first, and every
non-minimal event e must have an immediate local predecessor pred(e).
The causal ordering ≺ is also well-founded and is the transitive closure of <loc and the relation that
a receive event e is preceded by sender(e).
D ≡ {T : U | ∀x, y : T. Decidable(x = y ∈ T )}
ES ≡ E : D × Loc : D × Lnk : D
X : D × A : D × Tag : D
× T : Loc→ X → U
× V : Loc→ Knd(Lnk, Tag,A)→ U
×M : Lnk → Tag → U
× src : Lnk → Loc
× dst : Lnk → Loc
× loc : E → Loc
× kind : E → Knd(Lnk, Tag,A)
× val : e : E → V (loc(e), kind(e))
× when : x : X → e : E → T (loc(e), x)
× after : x : X → e : E → T (loc(e), x)
× initially : x : X → i : Loc→ T (i, x)
× sends : l : Lnk → E → List(Msgl(Lnk, Tag,M))
× sender : {e : E | isrcv(kind(e))} → E
× index : {e : E | isrcv(kind(e))} → N‖sends(lnk(kind(e)),sender(e))‖
× first : E → P
× pred : {e : E | ¬first(e)} → E
× <loc: E → E → P
× ≺: E → E → P
× p : ESAxioms(E,Loc, Lnk, . . . , pred,<loc,≺)
AntiReflexive(T,Rel) ≡
∀x : T. ¬R(x, x)
Transitive(T,Rel) ≡
∀x1, x2, x3 : T. (Rel(x1, x2) ∧ Rel(x2, x3)) ⇒ Rel(x1, x3)
WellFounded(T,Rel) ≡
∀P : T → P. (∀x′ : T. (∀x : T. Rel(x, x′) ⇒ P (x)) ⇒ P (x′)) ⇒
∀x : T. P (x)
〈e1, n1〉 <loc 〈e2, n2〉 ≡ e1 <loc e2 ∨ (e1 = e2 ∧ n1 < n2)
emsg(e) ≡ msg(link(kind(e)), tag(kind(e)), val(e))
ESAxioms(E,Loc, Lnk, . . . , pred,<loc,≺) ≡
Transitive(<loc) (1)
WellFounded(<loc) (2)
∀e, e′ : E. loc(e) = loc(e′) ⇔ (3)
(e <loc e′ ∨ e = e′ ∨ e′ <loc e)
∀e : E. Decidable(first(e)) (4)
∀e : E. first(e) ⇔ ∀e1 : E. ¬(e1 <loc e) (5)
∀e : E. ¬first(e) ⇒ (6)
pred(e) <loc e ∧ ∀e′ : E. ¬(pred(e) <loc e′ <loc e)
∀e : E. first(e) ⇒ x when e = x initially loc(e) (7)
∀e : E. ¬first(e) ⇒ x when e = x after pred(e) (8)
Transitive(≺) (9)
WellFounded(≺) (10)
∀e : E. isrcv(kind(e)) ⇒ (11)
nth(index(e), sends(link(kind(e)), sender(e))) = emsg(e)
∀e, e′ : E. e <loc e′ ⇒ e ≺ e′ (12)
∀e : E. isrcv(kind(e)) ⇒ sender(e) ≺ e (13)
∀e, e′ : E. e ≺ e′ ⇒ (¬first(e′) ∧ e ¹ pred(e′)) ∨ (14)
(isrcv(kind(e′)) ∧ e ¹ sender(e′))
∀e : E. isrcv(kind(e)) ⇒ loc(e) = dst(lnk(kind(e))) (15)
∀e : E. ∀l : Lnk. loc(e) 6= src(l) ⇒ sends(l, e) = nil (16)
∀e1, e2 : E. ∀l : Lnk. isrcvl(kind(e1)) ∧ isrcvl(kind(e2)) ⇒ (17)
〈sender(e1), index(e1)〉 <loc 〈sender(e2), index(e2)〉 ⇔
e1 <loc e2
∀e : E. ∀l : Lnk. ∀n : N‖sends(l,e)‖. (18)
∃e′ : E. isrcvl(kind(e′)) ∧ sender(e′) = e ∧ index(e′) = n
3.1 Consequences of the axioms
We state as lemmas some properties that follow from the axioms.
AntiReflexive(<loc) (19)
AntiReflexive(≺) (20)
∀e, e′ : E. e <loc e′ ⇔ ¬first(e′) ∧ e ≤loc pred(e′) (21)
∀e, e′ : E. e <loc e′ ∧ ∀e1 : E. ¬(e <loc e1 <loc e′) ⇒ (22)
e = pred(e′)
∀e, e′ : E. Decidable(e <loc e′) (23)
∀e, e′ : E. Decidable(e ≺ e′) (24)
∀e : E. ∀l : Lnk. ∀tg : Lbl. ∀v :M(l, tg). (25)
msg(l, tg, v) ∈ sends(l, e) ⇒ ∃e′ = rcvl(tg)(v). e ≺ e′
proofs: Lemmas 19 and 20 follow from the general fact that
WellFounded(Rel) ⇒ AntiReflexive(Rel)
Suppose e <loc e′. From axiom (4) and axiom (5) we conclude ¬first(e′), and from axiom (6)
we conclude
pred(e′) <loc e′ ∧ ∀e′′ : E. ¬(pred(e′) <loc e′′ <loc e′)
So ¬(pred(e′) <loc e) and hence, from axiom (3), e ≤loc pred(e′), which proves lemma 21. If
we also have ∀e1 : E. ¬(e <loc e1 <loc e′) then ¬e <loc pred(e′), so e = pred(e′), which
proves lemma 22.
We may now prove lemma 23 by induction, using axiom (2). By lemma 21 it’s enough to decide
¬first(e′) ∧ e ≤loc pred(e′), but this is decidable by axiom (4), the induction hypothesis, and
the decidability of equality in E. The proof of lemma 24 is similar. Using the other axioms we can
show that axiom (14) can be proved as an if and only if statement, and hence it is enough to show
that its righthand side is decidable. This follows from the induction hypothesis and the decidability
of equality in E, and decidability of first and isrcv.
Ifmsg(l, tg, v) ∈ sends(l, e) then for some n < ‖sends(l, e)‖,msg(l, tg, v) = nth(n, sends(l, e)).
By axiom (18) there is an e′ such that
isrcvl(kind(e′)) ∧ sender(e′) = e ∧ index(e′) = n
So, by axiom (11),
val(e′) = mval(msg(l, tg, v)) ∧ tg = mtag(msg(l, tg, v))
That implies that e′ = rcvl(tg)(v) and since e = sender(e′) we have e ≺ e′ by axiom (13). This
proves lemma 25.
3.2 Local histories
An event system is a rich enough structure that we can define various “history” operators that list or
count previous events having certain properties. Because we can define operators like these we do
not need to add “history variables” to the states in order to write specifications and and prove them.
The basic history operator lists all the prior events at a location.
Definition
before(e) = if first(e) then [] else pred(e) :: before(pred(e))
between(e1, e2) = [e′ ∈ before(e2) | e1 <loc e′]
rcvs(l, before(e)) = [e′ ∈ before(e) | isrcv(kind(e′)) ∧ lnk(kind(e′)) = l]
rcvs(l, tg, before(e)) = [e′ ∈ rcvs(l, before(e)) | tag(kind(e′)) = tg]
snds(l, before(e)) = concatenate([sends(l, e′) | e′ ∈ before(e)])
snds(l, before(e, n)) = snds(l, before(e)) append firstn(n− 1, sends(l, e))
snds(l, tg, before(e)) = [m ∈ snds(l, before(e)) | tag(m) = tg]
Using these operators we can state the following important lemma.
Lemma Fifo
∀e′ : E. ∀l : Lnk. isrcvl(e′) ⇒
snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′))) = [emsg(e) | e ∈ rcvs(l, before(e′))]
proof: The proof is by induction on <loc. Suppose isrcvl(e′). If
snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′))) = nil
then rcvs(l, before(e′)) must also be nil because, if e <loc e′ is a receive on l then by axiom (17),
〈sender(e), index(e)〉 <loc 〈sender(e′), index(e′)〉which makes snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′)))
non empty.
Otherwise, let
ms = last(snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′))))
then for some 〈e, n〉 <loc 〈sender(e′), index(e′)〉,
snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′))) = snds(l, before(e, n)) append [ms]
By axiom (18), ∃e′′ : E. isrcvl(kind(e′′)) ∧ sender(e′′) = e ∧ index(e′′) = n By axiom (17),
e′′ <loc e′, so by induction,
snds(l, before(e, n)) = [emsg(e) | e ∈ rcvs(l, before(e′′))]
If there were an e′′′ with isrcvl(e′′′) and e′′ <loc e′′′ <loc e′ then by axiom (17)
〈e, n〉 <loc 〈sender(e′′′), index(e′′′)〉 <loc 〈sender(e′), index(e′)〉
So, nth(index(e′′′), sends(l, sender(e′′′)) would come after ms in
snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′))) contradicting the choice of ms as the last of the list. Thus
rcvs(l, before(e′)) = rcvs(l, before(e′′)) append [e′′] and since, by axiom (11), ms = emsg(e′′),
we have
snds(l, before(sender(e′), index(e′))) = [emsg(e) | e ∈ rcvs(l, before(e′))]
¤
Corollary
kind(e′) = rcvl(tg) ⇒
‖snds(l, tg, before(sender(e′), index(e′)))‖ = ‖rcvs(l, tg, before(e′))‖
¤
3.3 Event system shorthands
We make some shorthand notations:
∀e@i. φ ≡
∀e : E. loc(e) = i ⇒ φ
∀e@i = pred(e′). φ ≡
∀e, e′ : E. loc(e) = i ∧ e = pred(e′) ⇒ φ
∀e@i = k(v). φ ≡
∀e : E. ∀v : V (i, k). loc(e) = i ∧ kind(e) = k ∧ val(e) = v ⇒ φ
∀e = k(v). φ ≡
∀e : E. ∀i : Loc. ∀v : V (i, k). loc(e) = i ∧ kind(e) = k ∧ val(e) = v ⇒ φ
∃e@i. φ ≡
∃e : E. loc(e) = i ∧ φ
∃e@i = k(v). φ ≡
∃e : E. ∃v : V (i, k). loc(e) = i ∧ kind(e) = k ∧ val(e) = v ∧ φ
∃e = k(v). φ ≡
∃e : E. ∃i : Loc. ∃v : V (i, k). loc(e) = i ∧ kind(e) = k ∧ val(e) = v ∧ φ
∃e′ >loc e. φ ≡
∃e′ : E. e <loc e′ ∧ φ
∃e′ <loc e. φ ≡
∃e′ : E. e′ <loc e ∧ φ
∃e′ ≥loc e. φ ≡
∃e′ : E. e ≤loc e′ ∧ φ
∃e′ ≤loc e. φ ≡
∃e′ : E. e′ ≤loc e ∧ φ
3.4 Change operator
Definition
x∆ e = (x after e 6= x when e)
∆(x, e) = ‖[e1 ∈ before(e) | x ∆ e1]‖
(only defined when T (loc(e), x) has decidable equality)
x∆n e = 0 < n ∧ ∆(x, e) = n− 1 ∧ x∆ e
The formula x∆ e is true when event emakes a change in state variable x. The formula∆(x, e) = n
is true when there have been exactly n changes to x strictly before event e. The formula x ∆n e is
true when there have been exactly n changes to x upto and including event e and one of the changes
is at e.
Properties of ∆
Suppose that, x ∈ X , i ∈ Loc, and T (i, x) ∈ D, i.e. the type of x at location i has decidable
equality. Then,
∀e@i. ∀n : N. (26)
x ∆ e, ∆(x, e) = n, and x∆n e are decidable
∀e@i. e <loc e′ ⇒ ∆(x, e) ≤ ∆(x, e′) (27)
∀e′@i.∆(x, e′) = n ∧ e = pred(e′) ⇒ (28)
∆(x, e) = n ∨ x∆n e
∀e@i. ∆(x, e) = 0 ⇒ x when e = x initially i (29)
∀e′@i. x when e′ 6= x initially i ⇒ ∃e <loc e′. x ∆ e
proof: lemma (26). If loc(e) = i, then x when e and x after e have type T (i, x) so if equality
in T (i, x) is decidable, then x ∆ e is decidable. We can then prove that the other predicates,
∆(x, e) = n and x ∆n e are decidable, by induction on <loc. Essentially, they are defined by
bounded quantification over the predecessors of e from the decidable x∆ e.
lemma (27) follows by induction on <loc.
lemma (28). Under the hypotheses,
n = ∆(x, e′) = ∆(x, e) + if x ∆ e then 1 else 0
If x ∆ e then x ∆n e and otherwise ∆(x, e) = n.
lemma (29) is proved by induction on <loc. If e has no predecessors then x when e′ = x initially i
so the assertion is true. If e1 = pred(e) and ∆(x, e) = 0 then, by lemma (28), ∆(x, e1) = 0, so,
by induction, x when e1 = x initially i. Also, ¬(x∆ e1), so x when e1 = x after e1 = x when e,
and hence x when e = x initially i.
lemma (30). Under the decidability assumption, ∃e <loc e′. x∆ e is decidable. If it is true then the
assertion is true. If it is false, then ∆(x, e′) = 0, so by lemma (29), x when e = x initially i, which
contradicts the hypothesis.
¤
4 Worlds
4.1 Definition of World
A world is a generalized trace of the execution of a distributed system. It has locations and links
from a graph 〈Loc, Lnk, src, dst : Lnk → Loc〉. Time is modeled as the natural numbers N. By
observing the system at every location i and every time t, we have a state s(i, t), an action a(i, t),
and a list of messages m(i, t). The state s(i, t) is the state of the part of the system at location i
at time t. We assume that the type of the state at location i does not change with time, and we
use a general model of state as a record. A record is a dependent function. If X is a type and if
dec : X → U is a type assignment, then the record type Record(X, dec) is
Record(X, dec) ≡ x : X → dec(x)
r.x ≡ r(x) , for r ∈ Record(X, dec) and x ∈ X
A world contains a type X of state variable names and and a type assignment T : Loc→ X → U.
The state at location i of the world will have type Record(X,T (i)).
The action a(i, t) is the action that was chosen by the system to be executed next at location i and
time t. It will always be possible that no action was taken at i, t so we must have a null action. Other
action will be local actions with names taken from a type of action names A, and also the action
of receiving a message. Every action will have a kind of one of these three forms (null, local, or
receive), and also a value whose type depends on the kind and location of the action.
Action(Lnk, Tag,A, dec) ≡
Unit+ k : Knd(Lnk, Tag,A) × dec(k)
isnull(inl(x)) = true
isnull(inr(x)) = false
kind(inr(〈k, v〉)) = k
val(inr(〈k, v〉)) = v
isrcvl(a) = ¬isnull(a) ∧ isrcv(kind(a)) ∧ lnk(kind(a)) = l
isrcvl,tg(a) = isrcvl(a) ∧ tag(kind(a)) = tg
The messages m(i, t) are the list of messages sent from location i at time t. For messages, we use
the message type Msg(Lnk, Tag, dec) defined earlier.
World ≡ Loc : D × Lnk : D × src, dst : Lnk → Loc
× X : D × A : D × Tag : D
× T : Loc→ X → U
× TA : Loc→ A→ U
×M : Lnk → Tag → U
× s : i : Loc→ N→ Record(X,T (i))
× a : i : Loc→ N→ Action(A,Lnk, Tag, kindcase(TA(i),M))
×m : i : Loc→ N→ List(Msg(Lnk, Tag,M))
If w :World is a world, then we write wLoc, wLnk, . . . , ws, wa, and wm for the components of w.
4.2 Fair-Fifo Worlds
We next define a fair-fifo world. We first note that, given world w, we can find all the messages sent
on link l and all and receive actions that have occurred on link l before time t:
m(w, l, t) = onlink(l, wm(wsrc(l), t))
snds(w, t, l) = concatenate[m(w, l, t1) | t1 ∈ [0, t)]
rcvs(w, t, l) = [a ∈ [wa(wdst(l), t1) | t1 ∈ [0, t)] | isrcvl(a)]
The send and receive messages before time t define an implicit queue, and we can test whether the
queue for link l is empty and for whether message ms is at the head of the queue for its link:
isempty(w, t, l) ≡
‖snds(w, t, l)‖ ≤ ‖rcvs(w, t, l)‖
ishd(w, t,ms)) =
let s = snds(w, t,mlnk(ms)) in
let r = rcvs(w, t,mlnk(ms)) in
‖s‖ > ‖r‖ ∧ s[‖r‖] = ms
FairF ifo(w) ≡
(1) (∀i : wLoc. ∀t : N. ∀l : wLnk. wsrc(l) 6= i ⇒
onlink(l, wm(i, t)) = nil )
(2) ∧ (∀i : wLoc. ∀t : N. isnull(wa(i, t)) ⇒
ws(i, t+ 1) = ws(i, t) ∧ wm(i, t) = nil )
(3) ∧ (∀i : wLoc. ∀t : N. ∀l : wLnk. ∀tg : wTag. isrcvl,tg(wa(i, t)) ⇒
wdst(l) = i ∧ ishd(w, t,msg(l, tg, val(wa(i, t)))))
(4) ∧ (∀l : wLnk. ∃∞t : N. (isrcvl(wa(wdst(l), t)) ∨ isempty(w, t, l)))
The first clause says that location i can only send message on links whose source is i. The second
clause says that a null action leaves the state unchanged and sends no messages. The third clause
says that a receive action at location i must be on a link whose destination is i and whose message
is at the head of the queue. The fouth clause is the fairness clause. It says that for every queue,
infinitely often either the queue is empty or a receive event occurs at its destination.
4.3 Event System of a World
If w is a fair-fifo world, then we can construct an event system from w. The types Loc, Lnk, X ,
A, Tag are already in w, so we have to define the type E of events and define all the operations on
events and show that the axioms are satisfied. Our events will be the points 〈i, t〉 in spacetime at
which an action occured in w.
wE = {〈i, t〉 : wLoc × N | ¬isnull(wa(i, t))}
wloc(〈i, t〉) = i
wtime(〈i, t〉) = t
waction(〈i, t〉) = wa(i, t)
wstate(〈i, t〉) = ws(i, t)
wstate′(〈i, t〉) = ws(i, t+ 1)
winit(i) = ws(i, 0)
wmsgs(〈i, t〉) = wm(i, t)
For and event e ∈ wE we have ¬isnull(waction(e)) so we may define
wkind(e) = kind(waction(e))
wval(e) = val(waction(e))
The type of the value of an event can be determined from its location and kind using the type
assignments wTA and wM as follows:
wV (i, k) = kindcase(wTA(i), wM , k)
The observation operators are defined in the obvious way:
wwhen(x, e) = wstate(e).x
wafter(x, e) = wstate′(e).x
winitially(x, i) = winit(i).x
wsends(l, e) = onlink(l, wmsgs(e))
The local ordering operations are also straightforward.
wfirst(〈i, t〉) = ∀t′ : N. t′ < t ⇒ isnull(wa(i, t′))
wpred(〈i, t〉) = 〈i, greatest t′ < t.¬isnull(wa(i, t′))〉
w<loc(〈i, t〉, 〈j, t′〉) = i = j ∧ t < t′
To define the sender and index operations that match a receive event to its origin, we first define a
match with the same snds and rcvs functions used in defining FairF ifo.
match(l, t, n, t′) = n < ‖m(w, l, t)‖ ∧
‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖ = ‖snds(w, t, l)‖+ n
Then, we define sender and index as follows
wsender(〈j, t′〉) = let l = lnk(wkind(〈j, t′〉)) in
〈src(l), µt < t′. ∃n : N. match(l, t, n, t′)〉
windex(〈j, t′〉) = let l = lnk(kind(〈j, t′〉)) in
let 〈i, t〉 = sender(〈j, t′〉) in
µn. match(l, t, n, t′)
Finally, the causal ordering ≺ is defined as a transitive closure
w≺ = transitive closure(w<loc ∪ 7→),
where
e 7→ e′ = isrcv(wkind(e′)) ∧ e = wsender(e′)
Putting all of these defined operations together, we have the event structure defined by the world
Ev(w) = 〈wE , wLoc, wLnk, wX , wA, wTag, wT , wV , wM ,
wsrc, wdst, wloc, wkind, wval, wwhen, wafter, winitially,
wsends, wsender, windex, wfirst, wpred, w<loc , w≺〉
Theorem (World-Event-System)
∀w :World. FairF ifo(w) ⇒ ESAxioms(Ev(w))
proof:
axiom 1, 2, and 3 These follow from the definitions of wloc and w<loc , which make w<loc on events at a fixed
location isomorphic to < on a subset of the natural numbers.
axiom 4 wfirst is defined by a bounded quantification and isnull is decidable, so wfirst is decidable.
axiom 5 Follows from the definitions of wfirst, w<loc , and wE .
axiom 6 Follows from the definitions of wpred, w<loc , and wE .
axiom 7 If wfirst(e) where e = 〈i, t〉 then all actions wa(i, t′) for t′ < t are null. So by clause
(2) of FairF ifo by induction we have ws(i, t) = ws(i, 0), and the axiom follows from the
definitons of wwhen and winitially .
axiom 8 Similarly if 〈i, t〉 = wpred(〈i, t′〉) then all actions wa(i, t′′) for t < t′′ < t′ are null. Hence by
clause (2) of FairF ifo, ws(i, t′) = ws(i, t+ 1), and the axiom follows from the definitions
of wafter and swhen.
axiom 9 By definition, w≺ is a transitive closure.
axiom 10 Since w≺ is the transitive closure of two relations, w<loc and 7→, it’s enough to show that
each of these relations agrees with the order of wtime. The first relation, w<loc does, by
definition. For the second, suppose 〈i, t〉 = sender(〈j, t′〉), then by definition, t = µt <
t′. ∃n : N. match(l, t, n, t′) so t < t′. But we haven’t yet shown that it exists, i.e. that
wsender is well-defined.
To show that, suppose that isrcv(wkind(〈j, t′〉)). Then, for some l and tg we have isrcvl,tg(wa(j, t′)),
so by clause (3) of FairF ifo, we havewdst(l) = j ∧ ishd(w, t′,msg(l, tg, val(wa(j, t′)))).
This means that for s = snds(w, t′, l) and r = rcvs(w, t′, l), we have ‖s‖ > ‖r‖ ∧ s[‖r‖] =
msg(l, tg, val(wa(j, t′))). But snds(w, t′, l) is the concatenation of m(w, l, t) for t < t′,
so for some such t, ‖snds(w, t, l)‖ < ‖r‖ < ‖snds(w, t, l)‖ + ‖m(w, l, t)‖, and this im-
plies that there is an n < ‖m(w, l, t)‖ such that ‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖ = ‖snds(w, t, l)‖ + n, so
match(l, t, n, t′). This argument shows that wsender and windex are both well-defined.
axiom 11 This axiom follows from the previous argument, since under the assumption that isrcvl,tg(wa(j, t′))
we found that wsender(〈j, t′〉) = 〈wsrc(l), t〉 and windex(〈j, t′〉) = n for t and n satisfying
nth(n,m(w, l, t)) = msg(l, tg, val(wa(j, t′))). Butm(w, l, t) = onlink(l, wm(wsrc(l), t)) =
wsends(l, 〈wsrc(l), t〉), so we have
nth(windex(〈j, t′〉), wsends(l, wsender(〈j, t′〉))) = msg(l, tg, val(wa(j, t′)))
and hence the tag and val components are equal as asserted in the axiom.
axiom 12 By definition, w≺ contains w<loc .
axiom 13 By definition, w≺ contains 7→, and this implies the axiom.
axiom 14 If e ≺ e′ then since w≺ is defined to be the transitive closure of two relations, there must be
a chain of these relations connecting e and e′.
If the last link of the chain is e′′ <loc e′ then we have ¬first(e′) and loclee′′pred(e′) and
e ¹ e′′, and so by transitivity we have the first possibility.
If the last link in the chain is e′′ 7→ e′, then e′ is a receive and e′′ = sender(e′) and
e ¹ sender(e′), so we have the second possibilty.
axiom 15 This follow from clause (3) of FairF ifo.
axiom 16 Once the definitions are unfolded, this axiom is exactly clause (1) of FairF ifo.
axiom 17 If e1 = 〈j1, t′1〉 and e2 = 〈j2, t′2〉 satisfy the hypotheses of the axiom then, as in the proofs of
axioms 10 and 11, we must have t1, n1, t2, and n2 such that
wsender(e1) = 〈wsrc(l), t1〉
windex(e1) = n1 < ‖m(w, l, t1)‖
‖rcvs(w, t′1, l)‖ = ‖snds(w, t1, l)‖+ n1
wsender(e2) = 〈wsrc(l), t2〉
windex(e2) = n2 < ‖m(w, l, t2)‖
‖rcvs(w, t′2, l)‖ = ‖snds(w, t2, l)‖+ n2
If sender(e1) <loc sender(e2) then t1 < t2 and this implies, by definition of snds(w, t2, l),
that ‖snds(w, t1, l)‖+n1 < ‖snds(w, t2, l)‖, and hence that ‖rcvs(w, t′1, l)‖ < ‖rcvs(w, t′2, l)‖.
This implies that t′1 < t′2 and hence e1 <loc e2. If sender(e1) = sender(e2) ∧ n1 < n2
then we reach the same conclusion. So, 〈sender(e1), index(e1)〉 <loc 〈sender(e2), index(e2)〉 ⇒
e1 <loc e2.
To show the reverse implication, suppose e1 <loc e2. By axiom (3) we have either
〈sender(e1), index(e1)〉 <loc 〈sender(e2), index(e2)〉 or 〈sender(e2), index(e2)〉 <loc
〈sender(e1), index(e1)〉 or
〈sender(e1), index(e1)〉 = 〈sender(e2), index(e2)〉. The first case is what we want to
prove, and the second case implies e2 <loc e1 (by the previous argument) which con-
tradicts our hypothesis. In the third case, t1 = t2 and n1 = n2, and this implies that
‖rcvs(w, t′1, l)‖ = ‖rcvs(w, t′2, l)‖. But, this is impossible since our assumption implies
that t′1 < t′2 and hence ‖rcvs(w, t′1, l)‖ < ‖rcvs(w, t′2, l)‖.
axiom 18 This axiom says that every message that is sent will be received. We prove by induction on
m that
∀m : N. ∀l : wLnk. ∀t : N.
m ≤ ‖snds(w, t, l)‖ ⇒ ∃t′ ≥ t. m ≤ ‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖
When m = 0 we can take t′ = 0 and the assertion holds. Assume it holds for m and prove
it for m+ 1. So let l and t be such that m+ 1 ≤ ‖snds(w, t, l)‖. By induction, we can find
t′′ ≥ t such that m ≤ ‖rcvs(w, t′′, l)‖. By the fairness clause (4) of FairF ifo, we may
choose t′ ≥ t′′ such that
isrcvl(wa(wdst(l), t)) ∨ isempty(w, t, l)
In the first case, we have
m ≤ ‖rcvs(w, t′′, l)‖ < 1 + ‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖ = ‖rcvs(w, t′ + 1, l)‖
so m+ 1 ≤ ‖rcvs(w, t′ + 1, l)‖. In the second case, by definition of isempty,
‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖ ≥ ‖snds(w, t′, l)‖ ≥ ‖snds(w, t, l)‖ ≥ m+ 1
So, in either case, ∃t′ ≥ t. ‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖ ≥ (m + 1) and that completes the proof of the
claim.
Now, to prove axiom 18, we let e = 〈i, t〉 be an event, and l be a link and suppose n <
‖sends(l, e)‖. Then ‖snds(w, t+1, l)‖ > ‖snds(w, t, l)‖+n. By the claim, we can find t′′
such that ‖rcvs(w, t′′, l)‖ > ‖snds(w, t, l)‖+ n. This implies that, for j = wdst(l), there is
a t′ such that
isrcvl(kind(wa(j, t′))) ∧ ‖rcvs(w, t′, l)‖ = ‖snds(w, t, l)‖+ n
So, we have match(l, t, n, t′). If we let e′ = 〈j, t′〉, then e′ is an event, lnk(kind(e′)) = l,
and sender(e′) = e and index(e′) = n.
¤
5 Message-Automata
Event systems and worlds are infinite objects, but they arise from the behaviors of distributed sys-
tems where, at each location, only a finite program constrains the behavior. We call our repre-
sentations of these finite programs message-automata. To make our representations finite we need
to replace infinite things like total type assignments with finite approximations, so we need some
notation for finite partial functions.
5.1 Finite partial functions
A finite partial function f from A to B has the type f : A→fpf B. Its domain is dom(f), and we
define
f(x)?z ≡ if x ∈ dom(f) then f(x) else z
Z =! f(x) ⇒ t(Z) ≡ (x ∈ dom(f))⇒ t(f(x))
For finite partial functions f, g : A→fpf B we define:
f ⊆ g ≡ ∀x : A. x ∈ dom(f) ⇒ x ∈ dom(g) ∧ f(x) = g(x)
f ‖ g ≡ ∀x : A. x ∈ dom(f) ∩ dom(g) ⇒ f(x) = g(x)
f ⊕ g ≡ λx. if x ∈ dom(g) then g(x) else f(x)
lemma
∀f, g : A→fpf B. f ‖ g ⇒ f ⊆ f ⊕ g ∧ g ⊆ f ⊕ g
lemma
∀f, g : A→fpf B. f ⊆ g ⇒ ∀x : A. ∀p : B → P.
(Z =! g(x) ⇒ p(Z)) ⇒ (Z =! f(x) ⇒ p(Z))
5.2 Definition of Message-Automata
The message-automata share with the worlds and the event systems the same spaces of names for
state variables, local action kinds, and message tags. So we will have parameters X , A, and Tag as
before, but, where a world has, at each location i, type assignments T (i) : X → U, TA(i) : A→ U,
and M : Lnk → Tag → U, a message-automaton will know only its input and ouput links In, and
Out, and its type assignments (declarations) will be finite
ds : X →fpf U
da : A→fpf U
din : In× Tag →fpf U
dout : Out× Tag →fpf U
The domain of ds is the set of declared state variables, the domain of da is the set of declared local
actions, the domain of din is the set of declared input message types, and the domain of dout is the
set of declared output message types.
The state of a message-automaton will be the record defined by its declarations ds. We can define
this type using the dependent function type Record(X, dec) used in the worlds by extending the
finite partial function ds to a total function. We do this by assigning the type Top to any undeclared
state variable.
State(X, ds) ≡ Record(X,λx. ds(x)?Top)
The type of output messages that the automaton has declared is defined in a similar way
Message(Lnk, Tag, dout) ≡ Msg(Lnk, Tag, λp. dout(p)?Top)
The kinds of actions that the automaton has declared and that can have effects on the state are a
subset of the kinds Knd(Lnk, Tag,A)
Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din) ≡
{k : Knd(Lnk, Tag,A) | kindcase(λa. a ∈ dom(da), λp. p ∈ dom(din), k)}
ktype(da, din, k) ≡ kindcase(da, din, k)
In addition, to its declarations, the message-automaton does the following things
init It constrains the initial values of the state variables. So, it has a finite partial function init of
type x : dom(ds)→fpf (ds(x)→ P). Thus, if x is in the domain of init then x is a declared
state variable and init(x) is a predicate on the declared type ds(x) of state variable x.
pre It declares preconditions on its local actions. So, it has a finite partial function pre of type
a : dom(da)→fpf (State(X, ds)→ da(a)→ P)
Thus, if a is in the domain of pre then a is a declared local action and pre(a) is a predicate
on the state and the declared type da(a) of the action.
ef It declares the effects of actions (local and input) on state variables. So, it has a finite partial
function ef of type
〈k, x〉 : Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din)× dom(ds)→fpf
(State(X, ds)→ ktype(da, din, k)→ ds(x))
Thus, if 〈k, x〉 is in the domain of ef then k is a declared kind (either a local action or a
receive of an input message) and x is a declared state variable, and ef(〈k, x〉) is a function
from the state and the type of the action to the type ds(x) of x. This function defines how the
new value of x will be computed from the current state and the value of the action.
send It declares the messages sent by actions. So, it has a finite partial function send of type
〈k, x〉 : Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din)× dom(ds)→fpf
(State(X, ds)→ ktype(da, din, k)→ List(Message(Lnk, Tag, dout)))
Thus, if 〈k, x〉 is in the domain of send then k is a declared kind (either a local action or a
receive of an input message) and x is a declared state variable, and snd(〈k, x〉) is a function
from the state and the type of the action to the type of lists of output messages.
frame It declares implicit effects. By convention, the effects that are explicitly given are the only
actions that affect the given state variables. So the implicit effect of any other action is to
leave the state of variable unchanged. Since we want each clause of a message-automaton
to be meaningful on its own, we can’t depend on such contextual conventions, so we have
to make the implicit effects explicit in so-called frame clauses. The message-automaton has
a finite partial function frame of type dom(ds) →fpf List(Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din)).
So if x is in the domain of frame then x is a declared state variable and frame(x) is a list
of actions kinds that contains all the kinds that affect x.
sframe It declares implicit sends. By convention, the sends that are explicitly given are the only
actions that send messages on the given link with the given tag. So the implicit sends of any
other action is to send no messages of the given link and tag. We make the implicit sends
explicit in sframe clauses. The message-automaton has a finite partial function sframe of
type Out× Tag →fpf List(Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din)). So if 〈l, tg〉 is in the domain of
sframe then l is an output link and sframe(〈l, tg〉) is a list of actions kinds that contains all
the kinds that send messages with tag tg on link l.
Putting all of these pieces into a structure we define the type of message-automata:
MsgA ≡
× X : D × A : D × Tag : D × Lnk : D
× In : {T : D | T ⊆ Lnk} × Out : {T : D | T ⊆ Lnk}
× ds : X →fpf U
× da : A→fpf U
× din : In× Tag →fpf U
× dout : Out× Tag →fpf U
× init : x : dom(ds)→fpf (ds(x)→ P)
× pre : a : dom(da)→fpf (State(X, ds)→ da(a)→ P)
× ef : 〈k, x〉 : Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din)× dom(ds)→fpf
(State(X, ds)→ ktype(da, din, k))→ ds(x))
× send : 〈k, x〉 : Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din)× dom(ds)→fpf
(State(X, ds)→ ktype(da, din, k))→ List(Message(Lnk, Tag, dout))
× frame : dom(ds)→fpf List(Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din))
× sframe : Out× Tag →fpf List(Kind(Lnk, Tag,A, da, din))
Message-Automata A and B have the same signature if their X , A, Tag, Lnk, In, and Out com-
ponents are equal. The subtype of MsgA with given signature 〈X,A, Tag, Lnk, In,Out〉 is
MsgA(X,A, Tag, Lnk, In,Out) ≡
{a :MsgA | aX = X ∧ aA = A ∧ aTag = Tag ∧
aLnk = Lnk ∧ aIn = In ∧ aOut = Out}
Message-Automata A and B are compatible (A ‖ B) or satisfy the relation A ⊆ B if they have
the same signature and the ten finite partial functions, ds, da, din, dout, init, pre, ef , snd, frame,
and sframe of A and B are compatible or are related by ⊆. And we define A ⊕ B by applying
the ⊕ operation to each of the ten components.
lemma
∀A,B :MsgA. A ‖ B ⇒ A ⊆ A ⊕ B ∧ B ⊆ A ⊕ B
5.3 Distributed Systems
A network is represented by a graph 〈Loc, Lnk, src, dst〉. The incoming and outgoing edges at a
vertex i are defined by
In(dst, i) = {l : Lnk | dst(l) = i}
Out(src, i) = {l : Lnk | src(l) = i}
A distributed system is a network graph, name spaces X , A, and Tag, and an assigmnent of a
message-automaton to each location.
Dsys ≡
Loc : D × Lnk : D × src : Lnk → Loc × dst : Lnk → Loc
× X : D × A : D × Tag : D
×m : i : Loc→MsgA(X,A, Tag, Lnk, In(dst, i), Out(src, i))
If D ∈ Dsys is a distributed system then we abbreviate Dm(i) by D(i). Distributed systems D
and E have the same signature if their Loc, Lnk, src, dst, X , A, and Tag components are equal.
Distributed systems D and E are compatible (D ‖ E) or satisfy the relation D ⊆ E if they have
the same signature and, for every i ∈ DLoc, the message-automata , D(i) and E(i) are compatible
or satisfy the relation D(i) ⊆ E(i). And we define D ⊕ E by applying the ⊕ operation to each
location.
5.4 Semantics of Distributed Systems and Message-Automata
The semantics of a distributed systemD is the set of possible worldsw that are consistent with it. To
be consistent, w must have the same signature as D, be a fair-fifo world, and respect the meanings
of the six components init, pre, ef , send, frame, and sframe of the message-automata at each
location.
Init(X,M, s) ≡
∀x : X. P =!M.init(x) ⇒ P (s.x)
MStep(X,A, Tag, Lnk,M, s, a, s′,m) ≡
∀x : X. E =!M.ef(〈kind(a), x〉) ⇒
s′.x = E(s, val(a) ∈ M.ds(x)
∧
∀x : X. F =!M.send(〈kind(a), x〉) ⇒
m = F (s, val(a) ∈ List(Message(Lnk, Tag,M.dout))
∧
∀x : X. L =!M.frame(x) ⇒
kind(a) 6∈ L ⇒ s′ = s ∈ State(X,M.ds))
∧
∀l : Lnk. ∀tg : Tag. L =!M.sframe(〈l, tg〉) ⇒
kind(a) 6∈ L ⇒ onlinktagged(l, tg,m) = nil
∧
∀a : A. P =!M.pre(a) ⇒ P (s, a)
FairPre(D,w) ≡
∀i : wLoc. ∀a : wA. P =! D(i).pre(a) ⇒
∃∞t : N. (¬isnull(wa(i, t)) ∧ kind(wa(i, t)) = local(a)) ∨
¬(∃v : D(i).da(a). P (ws(i, t), v))
PossibleWorld(D,w) ≡
FairF ifo(w)
∧ wX = DX ∧ wA = DA ∧ wTag = DTag
∧ wLoc = DLoc ∧ wLnk = DLnk ∧ wsrc = Dsrc ∧ wdst = Ddst
∧ ∀i : wLoc. Init(wX , D(i), ws(i, 0))
∧ ∀i : wLoc. ∀t : N. ¬isnull(wa(i, t)) ⇒
MStep(wX , wA, wTag, wLnk, D(i), w, ws(i, t), wa(i, t), ws(i, t+ 1), wm(i, t))
∧ FairPre(D,w)
lemma
∀D1, D2 : Dsys.
D1 ⊆ D2 ⇒
∀w :World. PossibleWorld(D2, w) ⇒ PossibleWorld(D1, w)
proof: D1, D2, and w all have the same signature, X , A, Tag, Loc, Lnk, src, and dst. For
every i ∈ Loc, M1 = D1(i) ⊆ M2 = D2(i). The definition of PossibleWorld uses the automata
M ∈ {M1,M2} only in the context of conditional application of the finite partial functions, M.init,
M.pre, M.ef , M.send, M.frame, and M.sframe, and also in some equality propositions over
types State(X,M.ds), M.ds(x), and List(Message(Lnk, Tag,M.dout)). The conditional ap-
plications all occur positively, and so the statement for M2 implies the statement for M1, by the
definition of M1 ⊆ M2 and the lemma on conditional application of finite partial functions.
The equalities also occur positively, and, so the equality for M2 implies the equality for M1 be-
cause State(X,M2.ds) is a subtype of State(X,M1.ds), and similarly, M2.ds(x) is a subtype of
M1.ds(x) and List(Message(Lnk, Tag,M2.dout)) is a subtype of
List(Message(Lnk, Tag,M1.dout)).
5.5 Rules for Message-Automata
The message-automata in a distributed system put constraints on the possible worlds that can be
executions of the system. We can state these constraints as rules on the event systems that come
from the possible worlds. A rule of the form @i M : ψ means that ∀D : Dsys. ∀w :World.
PossibleWorld(D,w) ∧ i ∈ DLoc ∧ M ⊆ D(i) ⇒ Ev(w) |= ψ
It says that the event system of any possible world of any distributed system with at least M at
location i will satisfy ψ.
5.5.1 Rule for initial clauses
@i state x : T ; initially p(x) : p(x initially i)
proof: Let i ∈ DLoc and let M = D(i) where
state x:T; initially p(x) ⊆ M
and let w be a possible world such that PossibleWorld(D,w). Then M.init(x) is defined and
equal to p(x), so by the Init clause of PossibleWorld,
p(ws(i, 0).x)
and this is, by definition of initially,
p(x initially i)
¤
5.5.2 Rule for frame clauses
@i only L affects x :
∀e@i. kind(e) 6∈ L ⇒ ¬(x∆ e) ∧
(x∆ e) ⇒ kind(e) ∈ L
proof: Let i ∈ DLoc and let M = D(i) where
state x:T; only L affect x ⊆ M
and let w be a possible world such that PossibleWorld(D,w). Let e = 〈i, t〉 be an event in Ev(w),
then a = wa(i, t) is not null. Let k = kind(a) and suppose that k 6∈ L. Then M.frame(x)
is defined and equal to L, so by the definition of PossibleWorld, s′.x = s.x, where s′, s =
ws(i, t), ws(i, t+1), and hence, by defintion of when and after, xwhen e = x after e, so ¬(x∆ e).
The second clause is the contrapositive of the first, just proved. In general, the contrapositive isn’t
constructively equivalent, but in this case, since the proposition kind(e) ∈ L is decidable, it is.
¤
5.5.3 Rule for effect clauses
@i state x : T1; action k : T2;
k(v) effect x := f(s, v) :
∀e@i. kind(e) = k ⇒ x after e = f(s when e, val(e))
proof: Let i ∈ DLoc and let M = D(i) where
state x:T1; action k:T2; effect k(v): x:= f(s,v) ⊆ M
and let w be a possible world such that PossibleWorld(D,w). Let e = 〈i, t〉 be an event in
Ev(w), then a = wa(i, t) is not null. Suppose that kind(a) = k. Then M.ef(〈k, x〉) is de-
fined and equal to f(s, v), so by the definition of PossibleWorld, s′.x = f(s, val(a)), where
s′, s = ws(i, t), ws(i, t + 1), and hence, by defintion of when, after, and val, x after e =
f(s when e, val(e))
¤
5.5.4 Rule for send clauses
@i action k : T ;
k(v) sends f(s, v) :
∀e@i = k(v). ∀l : Lnk. sends(l, e) = onlink(l, f(s when e, v))
proof: Let i ∈ DLoc and let M = D(i) where
action k:T; k(v): sends f(s,v) ⊆ M
and let w be a possible world such that PossibleWorld(D,w). Let e = 〈i, t〉 be an event in Ev(w),
then a = wa(i, t) is not null. Suppose that kind(a) = k. Then M.send(〈k, x〉) is defined and equal
to f(s, v), so by the definition of PossibleWorld, wm(i, t) = f(ws(i, t), val(a)), and hence, by
defintion of when, sends, and val, sends(e) = onlink(l, f(s when e, val(e)))
¤
5.5.5 Rule for send frame clauses
@i only L sends 〈l, tg〉 :
i = Dsrc(l) ⇒ ∀e′. kind(e′) = rcvl(tg) ⇒ kind(sender(e′)) ∈ L
proof: Let l ∈ DLnk and let M = Dsrc(l) where
only L sends 〈l,tg〉 ⊆ M
and let w be a possible world such that PossibleWorld(D,w). Let e′ satisfy kind(e′) = rcvl(tg).
BecausePossibleWorld impliesFairF ifo, we havemsg(l, tg, val(e′)) = emsg(e′) ∈ sends(sender(e′)),
where sender(e′) = 〈i, t〉 is an event in Ev(w), with i = Dsrc(l). Then sends(sender(e′)) =
wm(i, t) and M.sframe(〈l, tg〉) is defined and equal to L, so by the definition of PossibleWorld,
kind(wa(i, t)) ∈ L. Thus kind(sender(e′)) ∈ L.
¤
5.5.6 Rule for precondition clauses
@i action k : T ;
k(v) precondition p(s, v) :
∀e@i. kind(e) = k ⇒ p(s when e, val(e))
∧ (∃e@i. (kind(e) = k) ∨ (∃e@i. ∀v : T. ¬p(s after e, v)) ∨ ∀v : T. ¬p(s initially i, v)
∧ ∀e@i. (∃e′ ≥loc e. (kind(e′)) = k) ∨ (∃e′ ≥loc e. ∀v : T. ¬p(s after e′, v))
proof: Let i ∈ DLoc and let M = D(i) where
action k:T; precondition k(v): p(s,v) ⊆ M
and let w be a possible world such that PossibleWorld(D,w). If e = 〈i, t〉 is an event in Ev(w)
then a = wa(i, t) is not null. If kind(a) = k then M.pre(k) is defined and equal to p(s, v), so by
the definition of PossibleWorld, we have
p(ws(i, t), value(a))
and this is the same as
p(s when e, val(e))
So we have proved the first clause of the rule. Instantiating FairPre(D,w) with k, we may choose
t′ > t such that
(¬isnull(wa(i, t′)) ∧ kind(wa(i, t′)) = local(a)) ∨ ¬(∃v :M.da(k). p(ws(i, t′), v))
In the first case, we let e′ = 〈i, t′〉 and since kind(wa(i, t′)) = k and k is not null, e′ is an event in
Ev(w) and e <loc e′ and kind(e′) = k, so,
∃e′ ≥loc e. kind(e′) = k
In the second case,
¬(∃v :M.da(k). p(ws(i, t′), v))
Find the least t′′ ≤ t′ such that for all t′′′ in the interval (t′′, t′] the action wa(i, t′′′) is null. Then
t ≤ t′′, since wa(i, t) is not null, and hence wa(i, t′′) is not null, so we may choose e′ to be 〈i, t′′〉
and e′ is an event in Ev(w) and e ≤loc e′. The state ws(i, t′′ + 1) is the same as the state ws(i, t′)
because all the actions wa(i, t′′′) for t′′′ in the interval (t′′, t′] are null and so, by the definition of
FairF ifo the states are equal. Thus ws(i, t′) = s after e′ and we have
¬(∃v :M.da(k). s after e′, v))
Therefore, since M.da(k) is defined and equal to T ,
∃e′ ≥loc e. ∀v : T. ¬p(s after e′, v)
Thus we have proved the third clause of the rule. The proof of the second clause is similar to the
proof of the third clause, but since we are not starting with an event we also have to consider the
possibility that no events occur at all at location i. By the same fairness clause we still get a t′ such
that
(¬isnull(wa(i, t′)) ∧ kind(wa(i, t′)) = local(a)) ∨ ¬(∃v :M.da(k). p(ws(i, t′), v))
The first disjunct implies, as before, an e such that kind(e) = k. In the second case, we proceed as
before to find the least t′′ ≤ t′ such that for all t′′′ in the interval (t′′, t′] the action wa(i, t′′′) is null.
Ifwa(i, t′′) is not null, we proceed as before to produce an e′ such that ∀v : T. ¬p(s after e′, v). The
new case is that wa(i, t′′) might also be null. In this case t′′ = 0, so all the actions wa(i, t) for t ≤ t′
are null. In this casews(i, t′) is the same asws(i, 0), so we conclude that ∀v : T. ¬p(s initially i, v),
and that proves the second clause of the rule.
¤
6 Derivation Lemmas
For any label x we can constrain it to take a constant value at any location. Constant Lemma
∀x : Lbl. ∀i : Loc. ∀T : U. ∀v : T. ∀e@i. x when e = v
proof: Use the rules for the frame clause and initial clause
@i only [] affects x
@i state x : T ; initially x = v
to get
∀e@i. kind(e) 6∈ [] ⇒ ¬(x ∆ e) ∧ x initially i = v
This implies
∀e@i. ¬(x∆ e) ∧ x initially i = v
which implies
∀e@i. ∆(x, e) = 0 ∧ x initially i = v
By lemma (29), this implies
∀e@i. x when e = v
¤
For any label k we can make a local action k that occurs exactly once at any location.
Once Lemma
∀k : Lbl. ∀i : Loc. (∃e@i. kind(e) = k) ∧ (∀e@i <loc e′. ¬(kind(e) = k ∧ kind(e′) = k))
proof: Use the second clause of the rule for the precondition clause
@i action k : Unit;
k(v) precondition ¬done
to get
(∃e@i. (kind(e) = k) ∨ (∃e@i. ¬¬done after e) ∨ ¬¬done initially i
Use the rule for the initial clause
@i state done : B; initially done = false
to get
¬done initially i
so we have
(∃e@i. (kind(e) = k) ∨ (∃e@i. done after e)
From this we first establish the first clause, ∃e@i. (kind(e) = k. The first case is what we are
trying to prove. In the second case we have an e such that loc(e) = i and done after e but also
¬done initially i. From this we can conclude, by lemma (30), that
∃e′@i. done ∆ e′
Using the rule for the frame clause
@i only [k] affects done
we get
∀e@i. done ∆ e ⇒ kind(e) = k
From this we conclude kind(e′) = k which finishes the first claim.
To prove the second clause we use the rule for the effect clause
@i state done : B; action k : Unit;
k(v) effect done := true
to get
∀e@i. kind(e) = k ⇒ done after e
and the first clause of the rule for the precondition clause already introduced gives
∀e@i. kind(e) = k ⇒ ¬done when e
We can then prove by induction that
∀e@i <loc e′. ¬(kind(e) = k ∧ kind(e′) = k)
If e′ has no predecessors, then the statement is true. If e1 = pred(e′) then done when e′ =
done after e1 and if e <loc e′ and kind(e) = k ∧ kind(e′) = k then done after e and
¬done when e′, so we have e ≤loc e1 and done after e 6= done after e1 This implies that there
is an e2 such that e <loc e2 ∧ e2 ≤loc e1 such that done when e2 6= done after e2 and by
the frame clause already introduced, this implies kind(e2) = k. But then we have e <loc e2 and
e2 <loc e
′ and both e and e2 have kind k, contradicting the induction hypothesis.
¤
For any tag tg, location i, and function f , we can cause a message with the tag tg containing the
value f(s) to be received on any link l with source i.
Send once Lemma
∀tg : Lbl. ∀i : Loc. ∀f : State(i)→ T. ∀l : Lnk. src(l) = i ⇒
(∃e, e′. e ≺ e′ ∧ kind(e′) = rcvl(tg) ∧ val(e′) = f(s when e))
∧ ∀e1@i = tg. sends(e1) = [msg(l, tg, f(s when e))]
proof: Using the Once Lemma, we get
∀i : Loc. (∃e@i. kind(e) = tg) ∧ (∀e@i <loc e′. ¬(kind(e) = tg ∧ kind(e′) = tg))
Using the rule for the sends clause
@i action tg : Unit;
tg(v) sends [msg(l, tg, f(s))]
we get
∀e@i. kind(e) = tg ⇒ sends(e) = [msg(l, tg, f(s when e))]
From these we can conclude that there is an event e at location iwith kind tg andmsg(l, tg, f(swhen e)) ∈
sends(e). By lemma (25), we then conclude that
∃e′ >loc e. kind(e′) = rcvl(tg) ∧ val(e′) = f(s when e)
¤
Recognizer Lemma
∀k : Lbl. ∀i : Loc. ∀p : State(i)→ V (k, i)→ P.
∀e′@i. x when e′ ⇔ ∃e <loc e′. kind(e) = k ∧ p(s when e, val(e))
proof: From the clause
@i state x : B; initially x = false
get x initially i = false. So from lemma (30),
∀e′@i. x when e′ ⇒ ∃e <loc e′. x ∆ e
From the frame clause
@i only [k] affects x
we get
∀e@i. x∆ e ⇒ kind(e) = k
From the effect clause
@i state x : B; action k : T ;
k(v) effect x := if p(s, v) then true else x
we get
∀e@i. kind(e) = k ⇒ x after e = p(s when e, val(e)) ∨ x when e
This gives us,
∀e′@i. x when e′ ⇒ ∃e <loc e′. kind(e) = k ∧ p(s when e, val(e))
To prove the other direction of the iff, we see that the effect clause gives
∀e@i. kind(e) = k ∧ p(s when e, val(e)) ⇒ x after e
So it suffices to show that
∀e′@i. ∀e <loc e′. x after e ⇒ x when e′
This follows by induction from the frame clause and the effect clause since only action k can change
x and can only change x from false to true.
¤
Trigger Lemma
∀k, k′ : Lbl. ∀i : Loc. ∀p : State(i)→ V (k, i)→ P.
(∀e′@i = k′. ∃e <loc e′. kind(e) = k ∧ p(s when e, val(e)))
∧ (∀e@i = k. p(s when e, val(e)) ⇒ ∃e′. kind(e′) = k′)
proof: Use the Recognizer Lemma to get a recognizer state variable x such that
∀e′@i. x when e′ ⇔ ∃e <loc e′. kind(e) = k ∧ p(s when e, val(e))
Then add the precondition clause
@i action k′ : Unit;
k′(v) precondition x = true
∀e@i. kind(e) = k′ ⇒ x when e
∧ (∃e@i. (kind(e) = k′) ∨ (∃e@i. ¬x after e) ∨ ¬x initially i
∧ ∀e@i. (∃e′ ≥loc e. (kind(e′) = k′) ∨ (∃e′ ≥loc e. ¬x after e′)
The first clause ∀e@i. kind(e) = k′ ⇒ x when e and the recognizer easily imply the first clause of
the trigger. To show the second clause of the trigger, suppose kind(ei) = k and p(swhen e, val(e)).
Then for any e <loc e′ we will have x when e′. From the third clause of the precondition rule we
have
(∃e′ ≥loc e. (kind(e′) = k′) ∨ (∃e′ ≥loc e. ¬x after e′)
But the second case contradicts what we have just shown, so we have
(∃e′ ≥loc e. (kind(e′) = k′)
¤
7 Leader Election in a Ring
7.1 Specification of Leader Election
A flow is a subset F ⊆ Loc and a function out : F → Lnk such that
∀i : F. src(out(i)) = i ∧ dst(out(i)) ∈ F
We define the function n : F → F by n(i) = dst(out(i)). If n is one-to-one and connected,
∀i, j : F. n(i) = n(j) ⇒ i = j
∀i, j : F. ∃k : N. nk(i) = j
Then the flow F is a ring R, and n is onto R so we may define functions p and in by p(i) = n−1(i)
and in(i) = out(p(i)). We also define a distance d(i, j) = µk ≥ 1. nk(i) = j. Then,
i 6= p(j) ⇒ d(i, p(j)) = d(i, j)− 1
The leader election problem is to have exactly one member of a group announce that it is the leader.
If we choose to have the announcement be the occurence of the action ”leader” at a location, then
the specification of the leader election for a group R is the following
Leader(R) ≡ ∃ldr : R. (∃e@ldr = leader. )∧ (∀i : R. ∀e@i = leader. i = ldr)
7.2 Simple Leader Election
If R is a ring, and we have a one-to-one function, uid : R → N, then we claim that the following
specification is derivable and refines Leader(R).
LE(R, uid, in, out) ≡ ∀i ∈ R.
(1) ∃e = rcvout(i)(vote)(uid(i)).
(2) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). v > uid(i) ⇒ ∃e′ = rcvout(i)(vote)(v).
(3) ∀e′ = rcvout(i)(vote)(v). v = uid(i) ∨
∃e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). e ≺ e′ ∧ v > uid(i)
(4) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(i)). ∃e′@i = leader.
(5) ∀e′@i = leader. ∃e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(i)). e ≺ e′
Theorem1 If (R, in, out, n, p) is a ring and uid : R→ N is 1-1, then
LE(R, uid, in, out) ⇒ Leader(R)
proof: Assuming the hypotheses, we let m = max{uid(i) | i ∈ R} and let ldr = uid−1(m). Then
the conclusion, Leader(R) follows from the following four lemmas.
¤
Lemma1 ∀i : R. ∃e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(ldr)).
proof: By induction on d(ldr, i). If d = 1 then in(i) = out(ldr), so by (1)
∃e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(ldr)).
If d > 1 then p(i) 6= ldr and d(ldr, i) < d(ldr, p(i)), so by induction
∃e = rcvin(p(i))(vote)(uid(ldr)).
Then by (2), since uid(ldr) > uid(p(i)),
∃e = rcvout(p(i))(vote)(uid(ldr)).
and out(p(i)) = in(i).
¤
Lemma2 ∀i, j : R. ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(j)). j = ldr ∨ d(ldr, j) < d(ldr, i)
proof: By induction on ≺. If e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(j)) then by (3)
uid(j) = uid(p(i)) ∨ ∃e = rcvin(p(i))(vote)(uid(j)). e ≺ e′ ∧ uid(j) > uid(p(i))
In the first case, we have j = p(i) and this implies j = ldr ∨ d(ldr, j) < d(ldr, i). In the second
case, uid(j) > uid(p(i)) so p(i) 6= ldr and, by induction, we have
j = ldr ∨ d(ldr, j) < d(ldr, p(i))
But d(ldr, p(i)) < d(ldr, i), since p(i) 6= ldr
¤
Lemma3 ∀i : R. ∀e′@i = leader. i = ldr
proof: If e′ = leaderi then by (5)
∃e = rcvin(i)(vote)(uid(i)). e ≺ e′
Then, by Lemma2, i = ldr ∨ d(ldr, i) < d(ldr, i). The second case is impossible, so i = ldr
¤
Lemma4 ∃e′@ldr = leader.
proof: By (4), it is enough to show ∃e = rcvin(ldr)(vote)(uid(ldr)). But this follows from
Lemma1.
¤
Theorem2 LE(R, uid, in, out)
proof: We have to ”implement” each of the five clauses, by deriving them from the rules for
message-automata and event systems. Instantiate the Constant Lemma to get a state variable “me”
such that
∀e@i. me when e = uid(i)
Instantiate the Send Once Lemma using tg = vote, f(s) = s.me, l = out(i). This gives
∃e, e′. kind(e′) = rcvout(i)(vote) ∧ val(e) = me when e
and also
∀e1@i = vote. sends(e1) = [msg(out(i), vote,me when e1)]
which implies
∃e′. kind(e′) = rcvout(i)(vote) ∧ val(e) = uid(i)
which is clause (1) of LE(R, uid, in, out), and also
∀e1@i = vote. sends(e1) = [msg(out(i), vote, uid(i))]
Instantiate the Trigger lemma with k = rcvin(i)(vote), k′ = leader, p(s, v) = (me = v) to get
∀i : Loc.
(∀e′@i = leader. ∃e <loc e′. kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote) ∧ uid(i) = val(e))
∧ (∀e@ = rcvin(i)(vote). uid(i) = val(e) ⇒ ∃e′. kind(e′) = leader)
This gives us clauses (4) and (5) of LE(R, uid, in, out).
The rule for the sends clause
@i action rcvin(i)(vote) : N;
rcvin(i)(vote)(v) sends if v > me then [msg(out(i), vote, v)] else []
gives, (since (me when ei) = uid(i))
∀e@ = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). sends(e) = if v > uid(i) then [msg(out(i), vote, v)] else []
So
∀e@ = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). v > uid(i) ⇒ msg(out(i), vote, v) ∈ sends(e)
By lemma (25), this implies clause (2)
∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). v > uid(i) ⇒ ∃e′ = rcvout(i)(vote)(v).
Finally, to derive clause (3) we need a send frame clause to constrain the actions that can send
vote messages. In what we have derived so far, the only actions that send vote messages are the
rcvin(i)(vote) action and also the action vote from the Send once Lemma. So we use the rule for
the send frame clause
@i only [rcvin(i)(vote); vote] sends 〈out(i), vote〉 :
∀e′. kind(e′) = rcvout(i)(vote) ⇒ kind(sender(e′)) = rcvin(i)(vote) ∨ kind(sender(e′)) = vote
From this we can prove clause (3) since if e′ = rcvout(i)(vote)(v) then emsg(e′) = msg(out(i), vote, v) ∈
sends(out(i), sender(e′)). Then either kind(sender(e′)) = vote, in which case sends(sender(e′)) =
[msg(out(i), vote, uid(i))] so v = uid(i), or, for some v, sender(e′) = rcvin(i)(vote)(v), in
which case
sends(sender(e′)) = if v > uid(i) then [msg(out(i), vote, v)] else []
so we must have v > uid(i).
¤
At this point we have proved the leader election specification, so we can extract from our proof a
distributed system as an assignment of message-automata to locations. From this proof we get the
following clauses for each i ∈ R:
@i state me : N; initially me = uid(i)
@i state done : B; initially done = false
@i state x : B; initially x = false
@i action vote : Unit;
vote(v) precondition ¬done
@i state done : B; action vote : Unit;
vote(v) effect done := true
@i action vote : Unit;
vote(v) sends [msg(out(i), vote,me)]
@i action rcvin(i)(vote) : N;
rcvin(i)(vote)(v) sends if v > me then [msg(out(i), vote, v)] else []
@i state x : B; action rcvin(i)(vote) : T ;
rcvin(i)(vote)(v) effect x := if me = v then true else x
@i action leader : Unit;
leader(v) precondition x = true
@i only [rcvin(i)(vote); vote] sends 〈out(i), vote〉
@i only [] affects me
@i only [vote] affects done
@i only [rcvin(i)(vote)] affects x
7.3 Peterson Leader Election
Init(e, i) ≡ sends(e) = if sent when e then [] else [msg(out(i), vote, uid(i))]
Forward(e, i, v) ≡ sends(e) = if sent when e then [msg(out(i), vote, v)] else
[msg(out(i), vote, uid(i));msg(out(i), vote, v)]
P (e, i, v) ≡ last when e > uid(i) ∧ last when e > v
L(e, i, v) ≡ active when e ∧ start when e ∧ v = uid(i)
PLE(R, uid, in, out) ≡ ∀i ∈ R.
(1) sent initially i = false
(2) ∀e@i. sent ∆ e ⇒ kind(e) = init ∨ kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote)
(3) (∃e@i = init. ) ∧ (∀e@i = init. Init(e, i) ∧ sent after e)
(4) start initially i = true
(5) ∀e@i. start ∆ e ⇔ kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote)
(6) active initially i = true
(7) ∀e@i. active ∆ e ⇒ kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote)
(8) ∀e@i. last ∆ e ⇒ kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote)
(9) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). last after e = v
(10) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). sent after e = true
(11) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). (¬(active when e) ∨ start when e) ⇒
¬(active ∆ e) ∧ Forward(e, i, v)
(12) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). (active when e ∧ ¬(start when e)) ⇒
P (e, i, v) ⇒ ¬(active ∆ e) ∧ sends(e) = [msg(out(i), vote, uid(i))]
∧
¬P (e, i, v) ⇒ active after e = false ∧ sends(e) = []
(13) ∀e′ = rcvout(i)(vote)(v). ∀e. e 7→ e′ ⇒ kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote) ∨ kind(e) = init
(14) ∀e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). L(e, i, v) ⇒ ∃e′@i = leader.
(15) ∀e′@i = leader. ∃e = rcvin(i)(vote)(v). e <loc e′ ∧ L(e, i, v)
Definition
L(e1, e2) ≡ active when e1 ∧ e1 +7→ e2 ∧ kind(e2) = rcvin(loc(e2))(vote) ∧
∀e. e1 +7→ e ∧ e +7→ e2 ⇒ ¬(active when e)
LA(e1, e2) ≡ active when e2 ∧ L(e1, e2)
R(e) ≡ ‖rcvs(in(loc(e)), vote, before(e))‖
S(e,m) ≡ ‖snds(out(loc(e)), vote, before(e,m))‖
S(e) ≡ ‖snds(out(loc(e)), vote, before(e))‖
Lemma A Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀e@i. S(e) = R(e) + if active when e ∧ sent when e then 1 else 0
proof: This is an example of the proof of an invariant. We prove invariants by induction on <loc.
If first(e) then both sides of the equation are 0. Only init and rcvin(i)(vote) events can affect the
invariant. Each of them preserve it, since every receive causes one send, except for the case of a
Forward where sent was false, which sends two, but also changes sent from false to true, and the
case of a receive that sends nothing (second case in clause (12)), which also changes active from
true to false. The init event also preserves the invariant because it either sends nothing and leaves
active and sent unchanged, or else it sends one message and changes sent from false to true.
¤
Lemma B Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
(a) ∀e@i. start when e ⇔ R(e) is even
(b) ∀e@i <loc e′. sent after e ⇒ sent when e′
(c) ∀e@i <loc e′. active when e′ ⇒ active after e
(d) ∀e@i. ¬(sent when e) ⇒ active when e
proof: (a) follows from (4) and (5). (b) follows from (2), (3), and (10), since the only events that
can change sent set it to true. (c) follows from (7), (11), and (12), since the only events that can
change active set it to false or leave it unchanged. (d) follows by induction since the only event
that can make active false is a rcv(vote) where start = false, but this must be preceded by a
rcv(vote) where start = true, and this, by (10), set sent to true, and by (b) it will stay true.
¤
Lemma C Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀e2@ = rcv(vote). ∃e1. L(e1, e2)
proof: By induction on ≺. For some e we have e 7→ e2. Let i = loc(e). By (12) kind(e) is
either init or rcvin(i)(vote). If it is init then by (d) of Lemma B, active when e, so L(e, e2). If
kind(e) = rcvin(i)(vote), then if active when e, we have L(e, e2). Otherwise, by induction, we
have e1 such that L(e1, e) and e 7→ e2 and ¬(active when e), so L(e1, e2).
¤
Lemma D Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
kind(e2) = rcvin(loc(e2))(vote) ∧ e 7→ e2 ∧ ¬(active when e) ⇒
(val(e2) = val(e) ∧ R(e) = R(e2))
proof: For some m, e,m 7→ e2. Then, lnk(kind(e2)) = in(loc(e2)) = out(loc(e)) and, by the
corallary of the Fifo Lemma,
S(e,m) = R(e2)
Since ¬(active when e) we must have sent when e, so m = 1 and, by Lemma A
S(e) = R(e) + if active when e ∧ sent when e then 1 else 0
Also, val(e2) = val(e), since e will Forward and sent when e is true.
¤
Lemma E Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
L(e1, e2) ∧ R(e2) = n ⇒
R(e1) = n− 1 ∨ (n = 0 ∧ val(e2) = uid(loc(e1)))
proof: By induction on the length of the chain e1
+7→ e2. Let
C(e, e′) = R(e) = n− 1 ∨ (n = 0 ∧ val(e′) = uid(loc(e)))
For some e,m we have e,m 7→ e2. Then, lnk(kind(e2)) = in(loc(e2)) = out(loc(e)) and, by
the corallary of the Fifo Lemma,
S(e,m) = R(e2)
If sent when e, then m = 1 and, by Lemma A
S(e) = R(e) + if active when e ∧ sent when e then 1 else 0
So, if ¬(active when e) then val(e2) = val(e) (since e will Forward and sent is true) and
R(e) = n
and L(e1, e) so by induction, C(e1, e) and hence, C(e1, e2). And, if active when e then e1 = e
and
R(e) = n− 1
So C(e1, e2). This leaves the case, ¬(sent when e). In this case, by (d) of Lemma B, we have
active when e, so e1 = e. kind(e) is either init or rcvin(loc(e))(vote). If it is init, then m = 1
(since e sends only one message), and so
‖snds(out(loc(e)), vote, before(e))‖ = n
But, this implies that n = 0 since when ¬(sent when e) then there have been no sends before e.
Also, for the init case, val(e2) = uid(loc(e)) since that is what e sends. Hence C(e1, e2). If e is
a receive, then e sends two messages, first its own uid, and then the forwarded value. So m = 1 or
m = 2. If m = 1 then as before, n = 0 and val(e2) = uid(loc(e1)) so C(e1, e2). If m = 2, then
n = 1 and R(e1) = 0 = n− 1, and so C(e1, e2) in this case as well.
¤
Lemma F Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀e1. active when e1 ∧ ∃v : N. msg(out(loc(e1)), vote, v) ∈ sends(e1) ⇒
∃e2. LA(e1, e2)
proof: (Sketch) For any e, if e sends msg(out(loc(e)), vote, v) then the message is received, so
there is a receive event e′ = rcvin(loc(e′))(vote)(v). If active when e′ then we are done. Otherwise
e′ will forward v. If this keeps happening, then the message will eventually come around the ring
back to loc(e1) at some event e2. We need to show that active when e2. We would have L(e1, e2)
so by Lemma E,
R(e1) = R(e2)− 1 ∨ (R(e2) = 0 ∧ val(e2) = uid(loc(e1)))
In the first case, e1 is the receive just prior to e2. Since e1 sent something, it did not change active.
Only receive events can change active, so active is still true when e2. In the second case, e2 is the
first receive, so active must still be true when e2.
¤
Lemma G Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
L(e1, e2) ∧ R(e2) is even ⇒ val(e2) = uid(loc(e1))
proof: The inactive e in the chain from e1 to e2 are all receives and all forward the value they
receive. By Lemma E, R(e1) is odd or R(e2) = 0 ∧ val(e2) = uid(loc(e1)) . In the second case
we are done, and in the first, by (a) of Lemma B, ¬(start when e1) so by clause (12) e1 sends
uid(loc(e1)).
¤
Lemma H Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
L(e1, e2) ∧ R(e2) is odd ⇒ val(e2) = val(e1)
proof: The inactive e in the chain from e1 to e2 are all receives and all forward the value they
receive. By Lemma E, R(e1) is even so, by (a) of Lemma B, (start when e1) so by clause (11)
e1 forwards. If sent when e1 then val(e2) = val(e1). If ¬(sent when e1) then R(e1) = 0 and
R(e2) = 1, so we must have e1, 2 7→ e2 and so val(e2) = val(e1).
¤
Definition
A(n, i) ≡ ∃e@i = rcvin(i)(vote). active when e ∧ R(e) = 2n
Lemma I Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀i ∈ R. ∀n : N. A(n+ 1, i) ⇒ A(n, i)
proof: Follows easily from the definitions and (c) of the earlier lemma
¤
Lemma J Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀i : R. A(0, i)
proof: It’s enough to show that every i receives at least one vote, since on the receipt of the first
vote, active will be true (active can only be changed to false on even numbered receives). To show
that every i receives at least on vote, we note that init must occur and it sends one unless sent is
true, but sent is true only if init did send one, or a receive occured. Every receive sends at least
one vote, except when the second case of clause (12) happens, but this can only happen on even
numbered receives, so at least one send must have occurred.
¤
Lemma K Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀n : N. ∃i ∈ R. A(n, i)
proof: By induction on n. The base case is Lemma J. Suppose ∃i ∈ R. A(n, i). We show that ∃i ∈
R. A(n+1, i). Let m be the location with the maximum uid of all i such that A(n, i). Then there is
an ewith loc(e) = m and activewhen e andR(e) = 2n. By clause (11),msg(out(m), vote, val(e)) ∈
sends(e), so by Lemma G, ∃e2. LA(e, e2). By lemma E, R(e2) = 2n + 1, so there was a prior
receive at e1 for which R(e1) = 2n (and e1 active since e2 is active). So by lemma C there is an e0
such that L(e0, e1). By lemma G, val(e1) = uid(loc(e0)). We claim that loc(e0) = m. (why?) If
so, then, at e2 we have last when e2 = uid(m), hence, from clause (12), e2 sends something. By
Lemma F, there is an e3 such that LA(e2, e3), so we must have A(n+ 1, loc(e3).
¤
Location i, j ∈ R are consecutive locations satisfying predicate P if
Conseq(P, i, j) ≡ i 6= j ∧ P (i) ∧ P (j) ∧ ∀k : N. 0 < k < d(i, j) ⇒ ¬P (nk(i))
Lemma L Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀i, j ∈ R. ∀n : N. Conseq(A(n), i, j) ⇒ A(n+ 1, j) ⇒ ¬A(n+ 1, i)
proof: Suppose Conseq(A(n), i, j) and A(n + 1, j). Then there is are e′1 <loc e′2 <loc e′3
at location j such that active when e′3 and R(e′3) = 2n2, R(e′2) = 2n + 1, and R(e′1) = 2n.
Then there are e1 <loc e2 such that L(e1, e′1) and L(e2, e′2). Then val(e′1) = uid(loc(e1)) and
val(e′2) = val(e2), and hence, by (12) and because e′3 is still active, uid(loc(e1)) > val(e2). But
we claim that both e1 and e2 have location i (why?). Also, R(e2) = 2n so if e3 is the next receive
at i, then by (12), ¬(active when e3) so ¬A(n+ 1, i).
¤
Lemma M Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
∀i ∈ R. ∃e@i = leader. ⇔ ∃n : N. A(n, i) ∧ ∀j ∈ R. j 6= i ⇒ ¬A(n, j)
proof: (⇐) If A(n, i), then there is an e with loc(e) = i and active when e and R(e) = 2n. By
clause (11), msg(out(m), vote, val(e)) ∈ sends(e), so by Lemma G, ∃e2. LA(e, e2). By lemma
E, R(e2) = 2n+ 1, so there was a prior receive at e1 for which R(e1) = 2n (and e1 active since e2
is active). So by lemma C there is an e0 such that L(e0, e1). By lemma G, val(e1) = uid(loc(e0)).
We claim that loc(e0) = i. (why?) But, because of e1 we also have A(n, loc(e1)) so loc(e1) = i.
Thus at e1 location i received its own uid, and R(e1) = 2n. So by clause (14) ∃e@i = leader.
(⇒) By (15) there exist e where active when e and R(e) is even, and e is a receive of its own
uid. Then, by Lemma C, for some e1, L(e1, e) and, by Lemma G, val(e) = uid(loc(e1)), but this
implies that uid(loc(e1)) = uid(loc(e)), so loc(e1) = loc(e). All the intermediate e′ on the chain
from e1 to e are inactive and have R(e′) = 2n, so all have ¬A(n, loc(e′)), and they must include
all locations other that loc(e).
¤
Lemma N Assuming PLE(R, uid, in, out),
Leader(R)
proof: Let N(n) = ‖{i ∈ R | A(n, i)}‖. Then claim
∀m : N. N(m) = 1 ∨ lessN(m+ 1)N(m)
The claim follows from Lemmas I, K, and L. Then claim
∀n : N. ∃m : N. N(m) = n ⇒ ∃m : N. N(m) = 1
This claim is proved by induction on n, using Lemma L and the previous claim.
Now, if N(m) = 1 then ∃ldr ∈ R. A(m, ldr) ∧ ∀j ∈ R. j 6= ldr ⇒ ¬A(m, j), so by
Lemma M, ∃e@ldr = leader. And, for any i ∈ R, if kind(ei) = leader then, by Lemma M,
∃n : N. A(n, i) ∧ ∀j ∈ R. j 6= i ⇒ ¬A(n, j). By considering the cases n ≤ m and m ≤ n and
using (1), we see that i = ldr.
¤
8 View Synchrony
A view v is a pair 〈v.id, v.set〉 of a view identifier and a set of locations. There must be a transtitive,
anti-reflexive ordering < on the view identifiers. A view represents a named, ordered, guess about
the current members of a group. Suppose P is a set of locations and Iview is a function of type
p : P → {v : view | p ∈ v.set} that assigns an initial view to each location p in P . Suppose
that we have links from the locations in P to and from a service; that is, we have have functions
to : p : P → {l : Lnk | dst(l) = p} and from : p : P → {l : Lnk | src(l) = p}. Then the service
provides view synchrony if
Gpsnd(e,m, p) ≡ e = rcvfrom(p)(gpsnd)(m)
Grcv(e,m, q) ≡ e = rcvto(loc(e))(gprcv)(〈m, q〉)
Safe(e,m, q) ≡ e = rcvto(loc(e))(safe)(〈m, q〉)
Newview(e, v) ≡ e = rcvto(loc(e))(newview)(v)
V iew(e) ≡ if first(e) then Iview(loc(e)) else
if Newview(pred(e), v) then v else
V iew(pred(e))
V S(M,SM) ≡
(1) M(e1, e2) ⇒ e1 ≺ e2 ∧ V iew(e1) = V iew(e2) ∧
∃m :Msg. Gpsnd(e1,m) ∧ Gprcv(e1,m, loc(e1))
(2) ∀e′,m, q. Gprcv(e′,m, q) ⇒ ∃e. M(e, e′)
(3) M(e1, e2) ⇒ M(e′1, e2) ⇒ e1 = e′1
(4) SM(e1, e2) ⇒ e1 ≺ e2 ∧ V iew(e1) = V iew(e2) ∧
∃m :Msg. Gpsnd(e1,m) ∧ Safe(e1,m, loc(e1))
(5) ∀e′,m, q. Safe(e′,m, q) ⇒ ∃e. SM(e, e′)
(6) SM(e1, e2) ⇒ SM(e′1, e2) ⇒ e1 = e′1
(7) loc(e) ∈ V iew(e)
(8) e1 <loc e2 ⇒ V iew(e1).id ≤ V iew(e2).id
(9) V iew(e1).id = V iew(e2).id ⇒ V iew(e1) = V iew(e2)
(10) SM(e1, e2) ⇒ ∀p : V iew(e1).set. ∃e@p. e ≺ e2 ∧ M(e, e2)
(11) M(a, a1) ∧ M(a, a2) ∧ M(b, b1) ∧ M(b, b2)
∧ loc(a1) = loc(b1) ∧ loc(a2) = loc(b2) ⇒
a1 <loc b1 ⇔ a2 <loc b2
V S ≡ ∃M,SM : E → E → P. V S(M,SM)
Quorum(v, P ) ≡ 2 ∗ ‖v.set ∩ P‖ > ‖P‖
Complete(P,L) ≡ ∀p : P. p ∈ [snd(x) | x ∈ L]
GpRcvd(e) ≡ [val(e′) | e′ ∈ rcvs(to(loc(e)), gprcv, before(e)) ∧ V iew(e′) = V iew(e)]
Safe(e) ≡ [val(e′) | e′ ∈ rcvs(to(loc(e)), safe, before(e)) ∧ V iew(e′) = V iew(e)]
9 Consensus using View Synchrony
Here is an algorithm for consensus using VS:
∀e = rcvin(i)(propose)(c). vote when e =⊥⇒ (30)
vote after e = 〈c, weak,⊥〉
∀e = rcvto(i)(gprcv)(〈v, q〉). vote when e =⊥⇒ (31)
vote after e = v
∀e@i. ∃e′ >loc e. MayV ote(e′) ⇒ DoV ote(e′) (32)
∀e@i. CE(e) ⇒ SetWinner(e) (33)
∀e@i. DE(e) ⇒ elected after e = true (34)
∀e@i = rcvto(i)(newview). voted after e = false (35)
where
MayV ote(e) ≡ vote when e 6=⊥ ∧ voted when e = false ∧
Quorum(V iew(e), P )
DoV ote(e) ≡ sends(e) = [msg(from(i), gpsnd, vote when e)] ∧
voted after e = true
CE(e) ≡ Complete(P,GpRcvd(e))
DE(e) ≡ Complete(P, Safe(e))
MaxG(L) ≡ max([g | 〈〈c, s, g〉, q〉 ∈ L ∧ s = strong])
StrongV otes(L) ≡ [c | 〈〈c, s, g〉, q〉 ∈ L ∧ s = strong ∧ g =MaxG(L)]
AllV otes(L) ≡ [c | 〈〈c, s, g〉, q〉 ∈ L]
Winner(L) ≡ if StrongV otes(L) 6= nil then head(StrongV otes(L)) else
head(AllV otes(L))
SetWinner(e) ≡ vote when e = 〈Winner(RcvdV otes(e)), strong, V iew(e).id〉
Here is a summary of the instructions to each location participating in the algorithm:
1. A vote is a triple 〈c, s, g〉 of a candidate, strength, and view identifier.
2. The current view is primary if it contains a quorum.
3. If you receive a proposal for c and have no vote, then set vote=〈c, weak,⊥〉.
4. If you receive a vote for 〈c, s, g〉 and have no vote, then set vote=〈c, s, g〉.
5. If you have a vote 〈c, s, g〉 and have not yet voted, then, if primary, do Gpsnd(〈c, s, g〉) and
set voted to true.
6. If you have received votes from all members of the group, then select the winner w by
(a) If any of the votes had strength strong then choose the candidate from the earliest of
those with the highest id.
(b) Otherwise choose the candidate from the earliest vote.
(c) Set vote=〈w, strong, current.id〉.
7. If you have received confirmations (safe messages) of the votes from all members of the group
then set elected=true
8. If you receive a new view, then set voted = false and run the election again, but do not change
your vote.
Definition (agrees)
Agree(e, e′) ≡ ∃g : viewid. g ≥ V iew(e).id ∧
vote when e′ = 〈candidate(vote when e), strong, g〉
Lemma 1
∀e. DE(e) ⇒ ∀p : V iew(e).set.
∃e′@p. e′ ≺ e ∧ V iew(e′) = V iew(e) ∧ CE(e′) ∧ Agree(e, e′)
proof: Suppose DE(e), and let p = loc(e) and v = V iew(e). By definition of DE(e), safe
messages must have been received at p for votes from every member of the group, v.set. By view
synchrony, all members of the group must have received all the votes, and received them in the same
order. Thus, they all have had events e′ satisfying CE(e′), and, by clause (6), they had all set their
vote, vote when e′ to the same 〈c, strong, v.id〉. This includes location p, and since e has the same
view as e′, no new view has been received between e′ and e so p has not changed its vote, and hence
candidate(vote when e) = c, and hence, Agree(e, e′).
¤
Lemma 2
∀e. DE(e) ⇒ ∀e′. CE(e′) ∧ V iew(e′).id ≥ V iew(e).id ⇒ Agree(e, e′)
proof: Given DE(e), let v = V iew(e). We prove, by induction on ≺,
∀e′. CE(e′) ∧ V iew(e′).id ≥ v.id ⇒ Agree(e, e′)
Suppose CE(e′) and w = V iew(e′) and w.id ≥ v.id. Let q = loc(e′). If w.id = v.id then we use
Lemma 1. By Lemma 1, there is an event eq with loc(eq) = q, and V iew(eq) = v, such that
CE(eq) ∧ Agree(e, eq)
But there can only be one event e′ per location and view for which CE(e′), so eq = e′ and we have
Agree(e, e′).
So assume w.id > v.id. Views v andw are both quorums, since otherwise no votes are sent in them.
Thus there exists a location p ∈ v.set ∩ w.set. Let c = candidate(vote when e). By Lemma 1,
there is an event ep such that vote when ep = 〈c, strong, v.id〉. Let ewp be the event when new
view w is received at location p. Location p will only change its vote by clause (6), because of a
completed election, so by induction, vote when ewp = 〈c, strong, g〉 for some g ≥ v.id. Thus, in
the election in view w that is completed (for location q) at e′, p has voted for 〈c, strong, g〉. Only a
vote of the form 〈d, strong, g′〉 with g′ ≥ g could beat p’s vote. Such a vote would have to come
from some location in w.set that had set its vote to 〈d, strong, g′〉 at some event ed ≺ e′ (because
ed <loc voting in w ≺ vote received at q <loc e′). The only way to set a vote to 〈d, strong, g′〉 is by
a completed election in a view with identifier g′. Since g′ ≥ g ≥ v.id, by the induction hypothesis,
this implies d = c. Thus the winner of the election completed at e′ is 〈c, strong, g′〉 for some
g′ ≥ v.id and we have Agree(e, e′).
¤
Lemma (Consensus)
∀e1, e2. DE(e1) ∧ DE(e2) ⇒
candidate(vote when e1) = candidate(vote when e2)
proof: Let v = V iew(e1) and w = V iew(e2). Let c1 = candidate(vote when e1) and c2 =
candidate(vote when e2) . Assume, without loss of generality, v.id ≤ w.id. Let p = loc(e2). By
Lemma 1 , for some ep ≺ e2,
CE(ep) ∧ V iew(ep) = w ∧ vote when ep = 〈c2, strong, w.id〉
By Lemma 2,
∃g : viewid. g ≥ v.id ∧ vote when ep = 〈c1, strong, g〉
Thus, c1 = c2.
¤
10 Conclusion
10.1 Related Work
Winskel considered event systems in his 1980 Ph.D. thesis [60] and in other publications [61],
inspired in part by Lamport [38]. He considered relationships to Petri nets and to domain theory
and established the generality of event system, but he did not consider process extraction from
proofs.
Hoare [33] and Milner [48] created extremely influential process calculi and their work is the basis
for exploring process realizability of logical formulas [7, 49, 50], but they do not take up the issue
of extraction from proofs either.
One of the most direct approaches to using proofs as processes is the work of Abramsky [4, 5]
directed toward linear logic. These results are of considerable theoretical interest, but they have not
been connected to practical verification.
Verification based on IO Automata [42] has been directly modeled in Nuprl [11] and PVS [6] and
it is subsumed here as the special case where we reason directly about message automata. See also
Vardi[59], Clarke and Emerson [17], Manna and Wolper [46], and Leonard and Heitmeyer [40] for
different notions of sythesis that reference the meaning we intend.
Many logics used for practical reasoning and formal verification are based on programming logics
[62, 55] or on temporal logic [44, 45], especially Unity [16] and TLA+ [39]. We look at the
relationship between TLA+ and our work in the next section. Temporal logic has a limited role in
synthesis [23]. Results on knowledge in multi-agent systems [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30] uses models
with some of the properties of our worlds.
Abraham [1, 2, 3] uses classical multi-sorted first order logic to model processes whose state tran-
sitions are events. He also linearly orders events at a process and assumes a causal order on events
generated by the local orders, capturing insights from Lamport [38, 38]. Our approach is related to
his in that we use a higher-order constructive logic to define the models. His logic and ours deal ex-
plicitly with collections of events and with functions on these collections — another feature missing
from temporal logic.
10.2 Relationship to TLA+
Lamport’s TLA+ is a classical temporal logic of actions. He does not treat the issue of finding a
constructive sublanguage from whose proofs it might be possible to extract distributed systems. Our
work shows how this can be done. For a start, using the methods of Howe [34], the underlying logic
of TLA+ can be embedded in a constructive logic such as Nuprl. Secondly, the temporal logic can
be reduced to our event logic, as we now sketch.
Essentially the TLA+ process model arises by collapsing all locations to a single point and uniting
all states into one “global state.” Communication links are considered as state variables as well. The
logic is based on describing the next state relation in a computation viewed as a single sequence of
global states. This embedding would let us prove a result of the form:
TLA+ is a sublanguage of the classical Event
Logic obtained by adding the axiom
∀P : Propi. P ∨ ¬P
to the Event Logic defined in this paper.
10.3 Spaces of Events
The Event Logic formalism allows us to discuss classes and structured spaces of events. For exam-
ple, Strand spaces[56] consist of sequences of send and receive messages at a process and sequences
of send and receive messages of a penetrator process trying to break security. Thus strands are lo-
cations in event structures, and the ordering on elements is the same as our ordering on nonlocal
events. These spaces model limitations on penetrators, and are used in specifying correctness cri-
teria of encryption protocols [56, 29]. The methods of argument appear natural in our Logic of
Events, and we can use inductive methods similar to those employed by Paulson in Isabelle [53].
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